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BUSINESS NAMES
"A man's name," says Mitchell, J.,1 "is the designation
by which he is distinctively known in the community."
Another authority paraphrases the matter by stating that
the name of any given individual is the word or combina-
tion of words by which he is distinguished from other indi-
viduals, the label or appellation which he bears for the con-
venience of the world at large in addressing him or in
speaking of him or in dealing with him. 2 The purpose is
identity. An individual may select any name he sees fit,
legislative provisions on this score being in affirmance and
aid of the common law and to make a definite point of time
at which a change shall take effect.
In the business world an individual or combination of
individuals may, aside from statutory inhibitions, adopt any
name in which to transact business and may sue and be sued
by such name. 3 The prime requisite, however, is that the
identity of the individual or individuals may be clearly as-
certained.
At common law in partnership, a name is non-essential
and on the other hand a firm may select any name it sees
fit, fanciful or purporting to be that of a corporation, with
1Laflin & Rand Co., v. Steytler, 146 Pa. p. 442 (1891).
219 R. C. L. 1325.
319 R. C. L. 1333, authorities collected.
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this important limitation that there must be no tendency to
work a fraud upon others trading under substantially the
same name or upon the public.
4
STATUTORY CHANGES
As was pointed out by Mitchell, J., in Laflin and Rand
Co. v. Steytler,5 the first change on this subject made by our
legislature was in the Limited Partnership Act of March
21, 1836, P. L. 143, which provided inter alia that in the
firm name the individual names of the general partners
alone might appear and without the word company or other
general term suffixed, the appearance in the firm name of
the names of special partners to subject them to the liabil-
ity of general partners. The Act of March 30, 1865, P. L.
46, permitted the use of the suffix "and company" in the
firm title and also required the names of all the partners
special so designated as well as general to appear upon a
sign and the following Act of February 21, 1868, P. L. 42
provided that the firm name might consist of the name of
any one general partner, with the addition "and company",
notwithstanding the name might be common to such general
partner and any special partner, the provision of the previ-
ous act in reference to the sign requirement being retained.
The Partnership Association Act of June 2, 1874, P. L.
271, placed no restriction upon the firm name or title but
specified that the suffix must be the word "Limited."
The Act of May 9, 1899, P. L. 261, authorizing the
formation of partnerships with liability of the partners lim-
ited stipulated that no name or style of partnership should
be adopted which would include the name of any partners
whose liability was intended to be limited, unless there
should be added the word "Registered" and further provided
that the name of any partner ,with limited liability appear-
ing on signs, bill heads, letter heads or other publications of
4Burdick, Law of Part., 2nd Ed. pp. 86-87.
!Supra, note 1.
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the partnership should have suffixed the words "Limited
Liability."
The Partnership Association Act of June 7, 1907, P. L.
432, repeats the provision of the earlier Act of 1874, relative
to the suffix of the word "Limited" to the firm name.
The Act of April 12, 1917 P. L. 67, amending again the
already amended Act of 1899, provides that the word "Reg-
istered" shall be added to the name of the partnership and
further provides, that the written or printed list of partners
required to be posted shall have suffixed to each name, inter
alia, the words "Limited Liability."
The Uniform Limited Partnership Act of April 12th,
1917, P. L. 55, provides as follows:
"Section 5. (1) The surname of a limited partner
shall not appear in the partnership name, unless-
(a) It is also the surname of a general partner, or
(b) Prior to the time when the limited partner became
such, the business had been carried on under a name in
which his surname appeared.
(2) A limited partner whose name appears in a partner-
ship name contrary to the provisions of paragraph (1)
is liable as a general partner to partnership creditors
who extend credit to the partnership without actual
knowledge that he is not a general partner."
REGISTRATION STATUTES
As has already been stated a general partnership, like
an individual, may do business in any style of name selected
and no statutes so far have curtailed this common law priv-
ilege. The subject is not touched in the Uniform Partner-
ship Act of March 26th, 1915, P. L. 18.
However, there has been a registration statute in force
for many years. The Act of April 14th, 1851, P. L. 615
provides that persons doing business in a partnership capa-
city shall file a statement in the prothonotary's office in the
county where the partnership is carried on, setting forth the
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names and location of the members of the partnership, with
the name and style of the same, providing also for certifica-
tion as to changes, and making the penalty for violating its
provisions, inability upon the part of members when suit
is brought to plead any misnomer or omission of the name
of any partner, or the inclusion of the names of any strang-
ers as parties to the suit. The practical effect of this stat-
ute has been to abolish all pleas in abatement for misjoinder
or non-joinder although as is stated in Campbell vs.
Floyd,6 they may still be pleaded if the partnership has
complied with the provisions of the 13th section of the Act
of April 14, 1851, P. L. 615." Furthermore, the Act does
not preclude any defendant from raising the question
whether a partnership actually existed. 7 It may also be
noted that the Act is specifically saved from repeal by the
provisions of Sec. 46-Uniform Partnership Act of 1915.8
No act of assembly has been found affecting the right
of individuals, acting severally or in a partnership or joint
capacity, to bring an action or suit in assumed or trade
names until recent times.
The Act of 28th June, 1917.P. L. 645, provides that
no individual or individuals shall hereafter carry on or con-
duct any business in this Commonwealth, under any assum-
ed or fictitious name, style, or designation, unless the per-
son or persons conducting or carrying on the same shall
have first filed in the office of the Secretary of the Com-
monwealth and in the office of the prothonotary, to be en-
tered in a book to be provided for that purpose, a certificate,
under oath, and signed by such person or persons, setting
forth the real name or names and addresses of all the per-
sons owning or' interested in said business, and also the
name, style, or designation under which said business is be-
ing or will be carried on or conducted. The penalty provid-
6153 Pa. p. 93, Heydrick, J. (1893). But see Partial Act of
1915.
7The Scrantonian v. Brown, 36 S. C., p. 175 (1908).
8P. L. 18.
DICKiNSON LAW REVIEw
ed for neglect to file, or false swearing in filing, is a fine or
imprisonment, or both, in the discretion of the court.
PURPOSE OF ACT
In Walker vs. Mason,9 our Supreme Court quoted with
approval the language of the Michigan Supreme Court, re-
ferring to a similar statute of that state.
"The purpose of the statute is to protect the public
against imposition and fraud, prohibiting persons from con-
cealing their identity by doing business under an assumed
name, making it unlawful to use other than their real names
in transacting business without a public record of who they
are, available for use in courts, and to punish those who
violate the prohibition." It will be observed further that
the Act applies to either an individual so trading or a com-
bination of individuals.
ASSUMED OR FICTITIOUS
Said Trexler, J., in Moyer vs. Kennedy,10 "The word
"fictitious" is employed in connection with "assumed", and
we may reasonably conclude that the words are to be con-
sidered as expressive to some degree of the same idea. It
would therefore seem that where the names of all the par-
ties do not appear in their business style or designation,
such style or designation comes within the terms of the
act. "Moyer and Carpenter" does contain the family names
of two of the persons who purport to constitute the firm, but
the name of "Miller" the third partner, does not appear.
It may be argued that where the family names of all the
partners appear, the style or designation is not fictitious.
Such conclusion seems to be predicated on the facts that
the persons named in the style or firm name, although their
identity is not fully revealed, do actually exist, and the ti-
tle is true as far as it goes. Whether this be so, we need
9272 Pa. p. 322, Frazer, J., (1922). To same effect, Moyer v.
Kennedy, 76 S. C., p. 526 (1921)..
loSupra.
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not decide, but in the case before us Moyer and Carpenter
as stated before do not compose the firm. Instead of being
a partnership formed by two, there were three partners.
The title or style negatives the thought that there are three
partners. It is therefore fictitious. It conveys a false im-
pression." When the firm name of "Hughes and Dier,"
composed of Henry E. Hughes and Elder D. Dier, was
used, the same Court held the facts were not within the pro-
hibition of the act. 3' On the contrary where a firm entitled
"Jones and Baker," was shown to have no member by the
name of Baker but there was a member named Jackson B.
Sells, the act was held to apply.' 2 The firm of "W. and H.
Walker" was established eighty years before the contract
in question was entered into by the plaintiffs, the success-
ors, who happened to bear the same names as the persons
who originally organized the firm. It was held that "the
identity of the members of the firm was fully disclosed and
not in any manner concealed."' 3
CONDUCTING BUSINESS
In Serenado Mfg. Co. vs. Sensenig,"' the contract was
solicited by plaintiff's agent in this State and was signed
by the defendant here but it was not to be a complete con-
tract until the plaintiff approved it where it was
engaged in business, viz., Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
It was held that as this was the case and further
that, under the contract, all machines and supplies were to
be delivered to the defendant f. o. b. Cedar Rapids, the
business was transacted in Iowa and not in this Common-
wealth, the prohibition of the Act having, therefore, no ap-
plication. On the other hand, in Jones and Baker vs.
Heckler, 5 the plaintiffs, conducting a stock brokerage busi-
ness, had an agency in Philadelphia, where defendant's or-
"VHughes & Dier v. McClure, 77 S. C. 325 (1921).
'2Jones & Baker v. Heckler, 30 D. R. 1091 (1921).
IsWalker & Mason, see Note 9.
141 D. C. 20 (1921).
IsSupra, Note 12.
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ders were received and thence transmitted to New York.
Said the Court, per Ryan, J., "The statement avers that
plaintiffs maintained this branch office or agency in Phila-
delphia, where they "also conducted a business of buying
and selling securities in Pennsylvania for their customers."
This was clearly that "conducting or carrying on "business
contemplated by the act. At their place of business in
Philadelphia, the plaintiffs were entering into transactions
with customers, among whom the defendant was one."
PENALTIES
The statute provides as a sanction a fine or imprison-
ment or both, according to -the discretion of the Court. But
the judges have read into the law a more severe penalty.
In Moyer and Kennedy, 6 plaintiffs conducted a business in
the name of "Moyer and Carpenter." They were unregis-
tered and had a third partner, named "Miller," at the time
of entering into the contract in question with the defendant,
which, by the way, consisted of a book account for labor
and materials furnished the defendant from time to time.
It was not disclosed in the facts whether the defendant at
the time of purchase knew of "Miller" or relied particularly
upon "Moyer and Carpenter" or not. Waiving a defense
on the merits, at least, for the time being, defendant set up
as a defense, non-compliance with the provisions of the
act. Said Trexler, J.,L "The plaintiffs were, therefore, en-
gaged in an unlawful business. It was not only forbidden,
but declared to be a misdemeanor. The account against
the defendant was contracted in the prosecution of that
business; it was a part of the business in which they were
engaged and for which the firm was organized. It has
been the declared law of this Commonwealth for more than
a hundred years, that an action founded on a transaction
prohibited by statute cannot be sustained, although it be
1676 S. C. 523 '(1921).
1776 S. C. p. 527 (1921); Ferran v. Hines, 77 S. C. 274. See al-
so Snamon v. Maginn, 77 S. C. 287 (1921) accd.
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not expressly declared in the statute that the contract is
void. This was the rule of the common law in England
and the principle has been firmly established in this State.
Whenever it appears that the action is founded on a viola-
tion of a statute, the obligation is invalid." The learned
Court, after citing Maybin vs. Coulon, 4 Yeates 24, Co.
vs. Haldeman, 7 W. and S. 233; Seidenbender vs. Charles,
4 S. and R. 150; Holt vs. Green, 73 Pa. 198; Johnson vs.
Hulings, 103 Pa. 498, and Swing vs. Munson, 191 Pa. 582,
continued. "Applying the doctrine of these cases to the
facts presented by the pleadings, we see no escape from
the conclusion that the plaintiffs' action cannot be maintain-
ed. The business was conducted in direct violation of the
statute. It was not a matter collateral, or in any way inci-
dental, to the business, or so related to it that it could be
regarded as an independent transaction. "Is
PRACTICE
It is not necessary in order to entitle a plaintiff to re-
cover that registration should be averred or proved.1 9 Con-
versely, if the defendant relies upon such defense it must
be set forth in the affidavit. In Stein v. Slomkowski, the
defendant proposed this defense at the trial but the offer
was rejected on the ground that the proposed defense had
not been set forth in the affidavit of defense filed. This
action was approved by the Superior Court. ' 9a. The de-
fense should be raised, either in what might be termed, a
preliminary affidavit or a supplemental one, depending up-
on the procedure already taken. If matters ire in limine,
a preliminary affidavit may be filed in which the sole mat-
ter alleged is non-compliance with the terms of the statute.
ISSee remark of Frazer, J. Walker v. lason, 272 Pa. p. 321.
Per Keller, J., Stein v. Slomkowski, 74 S. C. p. 160, citing
19Per Keller, J., Stein v. Slomkowski, 74 S. C. p. 160, citing
Johnson v. Hubrige, 103 Pa. 498 and Creamery Co. v. Zim-
merman, 60 S. C. 278. 1 D. & C. 643, accd.
19a74 S. C. 156. If, however, the violation appears from plain-
tiff's evidence, advantage may be taken by defendant, although the
defense had not been pleaded. Josephson & Sons v. Weintraut, 78
S. C. 14 (1921).
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The fact, as alleged, would have to be proved at bar upon
argument on the affidavit. If not proved or the affidavit
be found insufficient, the defendant is given fifteen days in
which to file an affidavit to the merits. If an affidavit to
the merits has already been filed, the fact of non-compli-
ance with the terms of the statute may be set up in a sup-
plemental affidavit and disposed of as above. The ques-
tion cannot be raised on a statutory demurrer, when the
statement does not disclose whether a certificate had or
had not been filed. 28 The demurrer is to be used to test
the sufficiency of the statement as a matter of law. No
new facts can be alleged. "When an affidavit of defense is
employed, 'in lieu of a demurrer,' for the purpose of bring-
ing before the Court a question of law as provided in Sec-
tion 20 of the practice act of 1915, P. L. 483, such ques-
tion of law can not be raised upon facts which are brought
into the case by the averments of the affidavit itself; a
statutory demurrer, like one at c6mmon law, must not be
a 'speaking' demurrer, and the facts out of which the ques-
tion arises must otherwise appear upon the record: Mollen-
auer vs. Washington Co., 28 D. R. 199."21
Furthermore, where defendant raised the question in a
supplemental affidavit filed by leave of court and without
any proof of the averments of facts the case was placed on
the argument list, as if it raised only a question of law un-
der Section 20 of the Practice Act, it was error for the
court to enter judgment against the plaintiffs.
Said Keller, J.,22 "The Practice Act makes no provision
for the entry of such a judgment by the court on a rule,
without trial, in such circumstances and. on this state of
record ........ The defense was, if the facts were as al-
leged therein a good one: Moyer and Carpenter vs. Ken-
nedy, 76 S. C. 523; Snamon vs. Maginn, 77 S. C. 287;
Ferraro vs. Hines, 77 S. C. 274; but like any other matter
-OHauer v. Foster Dining Co., 50 C. C. 189 (1921).
2lCo. v. Goldstein, 4J C. C. 447, Brownson, J.
223ovaird v. Barrett & Son, 78 S. C. G8 (1921).
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of substantive defense it had to be averred in the affidavit
and proven at the trial: Stein and Samson vs. Slomhokski,
74 S. C. 156. It could not be raised by demurrer: Ibid,
pp. 159 and 160. It was held in Feldgus vs. Friedman, 269
Pa. 60, that even at the trial, the refusal of the 'plaintiff
when called as for cross examination to state whether he
had registered under the Act of June 28th, 1917, supra,
based on the ground that it might incriminate him, did not
justify an inference that he had not complied with the law;
that it was the duty of the defendants to produce direct evi-
dence of the fact, and that judgment non obstante veredicto
could not be entered on such a state of the record. Much
less can the unsupported averment in an affidavit of de-
fense concerning a fact, to which the plaintiff was not
obliged to make any reply or denial, justify the entry of
judgment in favor of the defendant." When plaintiffs
statement contained an averment that they had registered
and this was not denied by the affidavit of defense, it was
held the matter of registration was not a fact in issue and
could not be raised by defendant on motion for judgment
n. o. v. ; even though the admitted fact was not offered
and read into the record.
23
AMENDMENTS
The Act of 1917 has been amended twice. First, by
the provisions of the Act of June 20, 1919, P. L. 542, re-
quiring the Secretary of the Commonwealth and the pro-
thonotary of the proper county to cancel the certificate of
regustration or make a proper notation on the margin of
the record, when the business has been dissolved or the
person in question is no longer interested and stipulating
the procedure incident thereto. Second, by the provisions
of the Act of May 10, 1921, P. L. 465, amending section
one with a proviso to the effect that all contracts made by
firms or individuals with others without having first ob-
23
Per Berkey, J. ' Towzey, Phillips & Co. v. Miller, 2 D. & C.
305.
24
See Act of 1921 forbidding dentists practicing under trade
names.
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served the requirement as to registration shall nevertheless
be valid and enforceable in any of the courts of the state
or before any justice of the peace or magistrate thereof in
case the plaintiff comply with the act and pay to the Sec-
retary of the Commonwealth a fee or fine of twenty-five
dollars and the costs of suit incurred prior to compliance.
A. J. NVT HUTTON
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MOOT COURT
ROBINS v. STEPHENSON
Negotiable Instruments-Holder in Due Course--Affidavit of De-
fense--Sufficiency-Act of May 16, 1901 (N. I. L.), Sect. 59; P.
L. 194-Practice of May 14, 1915, Sect. 6; P. L. 483.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
X asked Stephenson for his check for $200 on his bank depos-
it, to be deposited by him X, with Y, from whom he proposed to
obtain a loan, stating that Y could hold it, not negotiate it, as se-
curity for the loan. The check was given. X however, instead
of borrowing the money, using the note as collateral security, ob-
tained no loan but transferred the check to Robins, who sues on
it. Stephenson having prevented the Bank from paying it by
notifying the bank not to pay, this action is brought. In his af-
fidavit of defense, Stephenson alleges these facts. He does not
deny that Robins paid value for the check or acquired it bona fide.
The court enters judgment for Robins for want of a sufficient affi-
davit of defense. Appeal by Stephenson.
OPINION OF THE COURT
ROSE, J. This is an appeal by the defendant from the order
of the court below, directing that judgment be entered for the plain-
tiff for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense. We think the
learned court below erred in its entry of the summary judgment,
and its judgment must be reversed.
Section 59 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of May 16, 1901.
(P. L. 194), provides: "Every holder is deemed, prima facie, to be
a holder in due course, but when it is shown that the t&'le of any
person, who has negotiated the instrument, was defective, the bur-
den is on the holder to prove that he, or some person under whom
he claims, acquired title as holder In due course."
The appellee contended and the learned court below in its en-
try of judgment ruled that under Section 6 of the Practice Act of
May 14, 1915, (P. L. 483) the burden placed on the holder by. the
second clause of Section 59 of the N. I. L. is met by the aver-
ment by the plaintiff in his statement of claim that he is a holder
in due course, and by the failure of the defendant, in his affidavit
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of defense, to specifically deny this allegation. We do not think
that Is so.
Sec. 6 of the Practice Act of May 14, 1915, (P. L. 483) pro-
vides: "Every allegation of fact in plaintiff's statement of claim
if not denied specifically or by necessary implication in the affi-
davit of defense ...... shall be taken to be admitted, etc."
The same contention as is advanced by the appellee in the case at
bar was advanced and rejected in the case of Rothrock Stores Co.'
v. Panzera, 72 Sup. 349. The facts in the case were similar to
the facts in the case at bar. The action was by an endorsee of a
negotiable note against the maker. The affidavit of defense filed
by the defendant averred that the instrument, upon which suit
was brought was obtained from the maker by fraud and misrepre-
sentation of the payee of its agent. The lower court made the
rule for a sufficient affidavit of defense absolute. The Superior
Court, in reversing judgment, in an opinion by Judge Head, held:
"The 6th Section of the Practice Act was not intended to repeal the
Negotiable Instrument Act so as to permit a plaintiff endorsee to
substitute a mere averment for a positive obligation to produce af-
firmative proof. When the defendant set up the fraud by which
the Instrument had been obtained, it was not necessary that he
should go further and aver that the plaintiff endorsee had notice
of that fraud, because the statute had so declared."
The case of Whipple v. Lewis, 74 Sup. 51, cited by the ap-
pellee in support of his contention, clearly warrants no such cita-
tion. It supports, very pointedly, the position we are taking. In
that case the plaintiff had objected to the charge of the lower
court that the presumption of law was that the plaintiff was a hold-
er for value and without notice, unless the defendant overcame the
presumption in the plaintiff's favor by showing that he had notice
when he took note of the fradulent misrepresentation under which
the orignal and renewal notes were obtained, or of failure of the
consideration. The Superior Court in affirming the judgment,
points out that if anything, the charge was more favorable to the
appellant than the law required,. In, an action on a negotiable in-
strument every holder is deemed, prima facie, to be a holder in due
course, but if the defendant proves that paper was put in circula-
tion by fraud, his defence will prevail unless the plaintiff establish-
es the fact that he or the person under whom he claims, has acquir-
ed title as a holder for value without notice. This doctrine is a re-
iteration and affirmation of the rule as laid down in the cases of
Second National Bank v. Hoffman, 229 Pa. 429; United Shoe Ma-
chinery Co. v. Winston, 58 Sup. 526; McChesney v. Guernsey.
61 Sup. 490.
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We hold therefore the rule to be that when the defendant in his
affidavit of defense alleges that the instrument was fraudulently
negotiated by setting forth facts showing such fraud, the burden
of proof shifts to the plaintiff to prove that he or some person un-
der whom he claims, acquired title as a holder in due course, and
that this burden is not met by averments in his statement of claim
to the effect. The defendant must prove these facts affilrmatively.
and no summary judgment can therefore be entered.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case will
proceed to trial.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Stephenson gave his check to X, in order that X might deposit
it with Y, as security for a loan by Y to X. X, however, has
transferred the check to Robbins, the plaintiff.
The check was elicited from Stephenson by a false represen-
tation of the use to which it was to be put. No action on it
could be sustained by X.
Robbins would have been deemed a holder in due course, but
for proof of these facts. The title of X being detective, the 59th
Sect. of the Neg. Inst. Act enacts that "the burden Is on the
holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims, ac-
quired title as holder in due course." X is not such holder, and
Robbins has obtained the check from him. The burden Is on
Robbins to prove that he paid'value and had no knowledge of the
defect in X's title. United Shoe Machine Co. v. Winston, 58
Superior, 526.
The learned court below has properly disposed of the supposed
difficulty arising from the Practice Act of May 14th, 1915; P. L.
483. It was not intended to repeal the 59th Sect. of the Neg.
Act.
The judgment of the learned court below is AFFIRMED.
BAILEY v. CAMERON
W*ills-Vested and Contingent Reniainders--Construction--Intention
STATEMENT OF FACTS
X devised a house and lot to his widow for life; and after her
death, to his son, John in fee; but he added, "should my son die
before his mother, I devise the house to his heirs." John and his
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mother convey to Cameron the house in fee. Later, John died.
The plaintiff, his only child brings ejectment against Cameron, his
grandmother being dead.
Rose for the Plaintiff.
Sloan for the Defendant.
OPINION OP THE) COURT
SCIOTTO, J. This action of ejectment is instituted by a
grandson of the testator, who claims title to the premises under
the will of X, said testator. The defendant, Cameron, is a grantee
of the land in dispute having acquired title thereto, by a deed,
jointly executed by the life tenant, the widow of X, and John the
son of X. The action is sought to be sustained on the theory that
the widow received a life estate and John a contingent reminder
and that the joint execution of the deed had no effect on the grand-
son's right.. This theory is met by that of the defendant who argues
that the widow took a life estate, while John took a vested remain-
der and the deed jointly executed by the life tenant and the vested
remainderman, conveyed an indefeasible title.
The will provides for a life estate to the widow, and upon her
death an estate in fee to the testator's son. The testator then adds
"should my son die before his mother, I devise the house to his
heirs." John did die before his mother, but his death followed the
joint convenance to the defendant. Neither counsel commented on
this and since the property has been transferred before the happen-
ing of the condition, we are disposed to feel that this phrase of the
case is unimportant.
The solution of the problem before us necessitates the answer-
ing of several Implicated questions. If it can be shown that John
took (1) a vested remainder; (2) that a vested remainder may be
conveyed; and that (3) the heirs of John had nothing but a contin-
gent remainder, which is nothing more than a gambling chance
and no interest In the land whatsoever, we shall be constrained to
dismiss the plaintiff's action.
The provision in the will, "should my son die before his moth-
er, I devise the house to his heirs," may be dispelled from consid-
eration in this case on the authority of Womrath et al v. McCor-
mick, 51 Pa. 504. In that case the court commenting on a sim-
ilar provision said: "The first object of the testator's bounty was
his widow, and the second his children, and in event of death be-
fore partition, their Issue. This designation was nothing. It was
what the law provides, and hence created no contingency of es-
tate in his children."
In the law of real property, remainders are usually referred to
as being vested or contingent. "A vested remainder is one
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whereby the estate passes by the conveyance but the enjoyment
and possession are postponed until the particular estate Is de-
termined and where the estate is invariably fixed to remain to
certain determined persons. A contingent remainder is one where
the estate in remainder is limited to take effect either to a dubi-
ous or uncertain person or upon a dubious or uncertain event; so
that the particular estate may be determined and the remainder
never take effect." These definitions are extracted from Black-
stone and Kent, Washburn on Real Property. In Doe, Lessee of
Poor v. Considine, 6 Wall. 474, the U. S. Supreme Court defines
a vested remainder as follows: "Where a present interest passes
to a certain and definite person." Other holdings follow, "The
vested or contingent character of an estate is not to be tested by
the certainty or uncertainty of obtaining possession for that would
make its character depend not upon terms of its creation but on the
form of the result; nor by the defeasibility or indefeasibility of the
right of possession for many estates are vested without possession
as well as with it and are yet defeasible. If there be a present
right of future possession through that right may be defeated by
some future event, contingent or certain, there Is nevertheless a
vested estate. An unpossessed estate is vested if it is certain to
take effect in possession by enduring longer than the precedent
estate." Hood v. Maires, 255 Pa. 131; Manderson v. Lukins, 23
Pa. 31; Nell's Estate, 252 Pa. 394. Where there is no moment
that the remainderman in fee would not have an immediate right
to the estate on the death of the life tenant, it is a vested remain-
der, 9 L. R. A. 212. In 3 L. R. A. 690, it is said: "It is the
present capacity of taking effect in possession if the possession
were to become vacant and not the certainty that the possession
will become vacant before the estate limited In remainder deter-
mines, that universally distinguishes a vested remainder from one
that is contingent. In cases of doubt, the law prefers vested to con-
tingent remainders, and unless it clearly appears from the con-
text or circumstances of the case, that a contingent interest was
intended, the remainder will be regarded as vested at the death
of the testator and not at the expiration of the life tenant.
Bache's Estate, 246 Pa. 276; McFillin's Estate, 235 Pa. 175.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, we find that
the person to take after the life estate was John, certain and In
being at the testator's death and in accordance with the rules
above referred to,' he took a vested interest then and there. The
contingency upon which his enjoyment and possession of the land
devised depended was the death of his mother, a condition which
unavoidably had to happen by the effluxion of time. There was
nothing more in this will than a postponement of the enjoyment
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and possession of the fee by John. The heirs of John for which
the testator provides in case of his death, were uncertain and du-
bius. The event upon which depended their right to take any-
thing was uncertain and dubious also. These references would
have us hold that John took a vested remainder.
On the premise that John took a vested remainder, we pro-
ceed to the consideration as to, whether or not this remainder was
a subject of conveyance and if so what effect it had upon the
rights which the heir of John attempts to declare.
There is no doubt in the legal mind that a life estate may be
conveyed. Thus the widow in this case could have conveyed her
life estate without the joinder of John but the grantee would take
subject to John's vested interest for a vested remainder cannot
be defeated by a conveyance of the particular estate. The right
of a vested remainderman in the land devised Is property or own-
ership. While it is true he has neither actual nor constructive
possession of the land, but simply an estate to vest in possession
in future, the vested remainder conferred a present fixed right to
the future enjoyment which rises to the dignity of an estate In the
land and thereby invested him with a portion of the selsin, prop-
erty or ownership. It was as truly a present fixed property or
ownership as is an estate in praesenti, though it could only take
effect in possession at a future period. It was an actual estate
and must be considered property as much as the particular estate.
(23 R. C. L. 506). The vested remainder being property, John by
joining in the deed conveyed it. A vested remainder may be con-
veyed (Gardiner v. Guild, 106 Mass. 25) and the Inadequacy of
the consideration is no ground for setting aside the conveyance
(Phillip's Estate, 205 Pa. 511). But the plaintiff contends that this
conveyance could not cut off his interest. What interest? The
plaintiff had nothing more than a naked contingent possibility.
The property was conveyed before the occurrence of the contin-
gency (i. e. John's death before his mother). The effect of the con-
veyance was to defeat any ghostly interest the plaintiff might
have had. He had no more of an estate than an heir apparent.
A contingent reminder does not arise to the dignity of an estate
in the land and confers no interest in the seisin. While it may
be an interest, though a contingent one, strictly speaking it is
not an estate at all, but a mere chance of having one If the con-
tingency turns ot favorably to the remainderman. (23 R. C. L.
507).
With these references and the fact of the joint conveyance of
the life estate and vested remainder, what happens to the contin-
gent remainder of the plaintiff? It is the general rule that a re-
mainder must have a precedent particular estate to support It
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and must vest during the continuance of this estat or eo instanti
It determines. It follows that if the particular estate determines
or is defeated before the happening of the contingency upon which
alone the remainder can vest, any contingent remainder depend-
ing thereon will be defeated and it is immaterial whether the pre-
ceding particular estate is ended by reaching its natural limit or
by the act of the tenant or by the operation of law or by a tortious
conveyance. McCay v. Clayton, 119 Pa. 133; Lyle v. Richards, 9
S. & R. 322; 16 Cyc. 655.
A case with facts similar to the one at bar is found in Harris
v. Carpenter, 109 Ind. 492. The testator devised his property to
his wife for life and at her death said property was to go to his
daughter, L, in fee, but if "I,, be not living, then her heirs for-
ever." It was held that the daughter, L, took a vested remain-
der in fee of such realty at the testator's death. The court said
In this case that the policy of the law favors vested remainders
for the reason that it helps to quiet titles to realty.
Our conclusion then is that, John took a vested remainder and
the plaintiff a contingent remainder; that a vested remainder be-
ing property may be conveyed; that when the precedent particular
estate is destroyed or transferred the expectancy of the contin-
gent remainderman disappears and these events having occurred
in this case, the plaintiff has nothing. That the condition men-
tioned in the will had reference to the time of the testator's
death, John became seized of a vested remainder In fee in the land
devised. It was evidently the intention of the testator to dispose
of his entire estate in this land at the time of his death and as
he only devised a life estate to his wife and as the fee simple had,
in the meantime, to lodge somewhere, it could not, under the will,
have reasonably done otherwise than to vest in John who was
then living and for whom and whose heirs the estate in remain-
der was ultimately intended and the defendant should not be mo-
lested in the quiet and peaceable enjoyment of the premises.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COTT
A life estate was given, by the will of X, to his widow. He
then created two alternative remainders, one to his son John, in
case he should survive his mother; the other to the heirs of
John, should John die before his mother. The alternative remain-
ders were contingent until the death of the widow. Then, one of
them became a nullity, and the other a vested fee. Before the
contingency was resolved, John and his mother conveyed their
estate to Cameron. But, such conveyance could not change its
quality; could not transmute it from contingent to vested. Cam-
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eron obtained only what his grantors had; a vested life estate; a
contingent fee.
This fee has since been extinguished by the death of John
before his mother. A vested fee has attached to Bailey, who,
therefore, is entitled to recover the possession from his father's
grantee.
It is needless to speculate concerning the reason which in-
fluenced the testator to make the fee given to his son contin-
gent.
This is not a case of giving, unconditionally a fee, and at-
tempting to deprive the fee of some of its essential qualities. The
whole will must be read, to discover the intention of the testator.
While the clause In which the gift to John In fee is made, would,
unqualified give a vested fee, the immediately following sen-
tence shows too distinctly for mistake in interpreting the inten-
tion, that the gift to John 'was suspended on survivorship of the
widow, and that, John not surviving her, not he, but his heirs
were to take the fee. The function of the court is to discover
what the testator intended; not to quarrel with him because he
has not expressed his thoughts in the rhetoric which the judges
might have used. Perhaps Frasier v. Scranton Gas & Water
Co., 249 Pa. 570, will be found a sufficient authority.
It is necessary to reverse the judgment of the learned court
below.
Reversed with v. f. d. n.
BICKLEY v. JAMISON
Stock Brokers-Purchase of Stock on Margin--Sale of Stock
Without Notice-Conversion-Measure of Damages
STATEMENT OF PACTS
Jamison was a stock broker. He bought shares of stock and
other securities fof Bickley on margin. The market declining
sharply, he sold the stock, at a sacrifice because an insufficient
margin had been furnished him. This he did, without warning
Bickley and giving him an opportunity to Insure the margin and
to save the securities. In the action for conversion of the securi-
ties Bickley asked for the highest-market value the stocks attain-
ed, since the conversion and down to the time of trial. Jamison
alleges that the fact that value of the stocks was sinking sudden-
ly by reason of the European War, justified his quick action in
making the sale, especially as Bickley was out of the country at
the time, so that notice to him before the sale was impossible.
Bachman f6r the Plaintiff.
Forcey for the Defendant.
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OPINION OF THE) COURT
LOVELAND, J. This case is decided by the answer.to the
question of whether it is necessary or not, for a stock broker to
give notice to his customer before he sells his stock, which he
holds on margin, where the condition of the market suddenly
changes, and the broker has not sufficient margin to insure him-
self.
Where a broker agrees to buy stock on margin for his cus-
tomer, the relation of the parties is that of a pledgor and pledgee,
and the matter of conducting their business, then it becomes nec-
essary to follow the rules and principles of the common law that
are applicable to such a relationship. Though having certain
property rights in the things pledged, the pledgee has no right of
disposal except under well defined conditions. One of these con-
ditions requires that before any sale be made to answer for any
default of the pledgor, the pledgee shall give notice .to the pledgor,
or someone standing in interest, in order that opportunity may
be afforded him to continue the pledge. Where as In the pres-
ent case there is a contract to carry stocks upon margin, an
agreement, as part of the contract is implied, that such stocks
shall not be sold, in case there is danger of the exhaustion of the
margin, until additional margin shall have been applied for. A
sale of the stock without notice is a breach of the contract on the
part of the broker. Berberich's Estate 267 Pa. 181.
The authorities in this state seem in accord with the rule
that it is necessary for a stock broker to give notice to his cus-
tomer before selling stock which he holds on margin. There do
not appear to be any exceptions to the above rule. Therefore
this court holds that when the defendant sold the stock without
giving notice to the plaintiff he converted the same. The meas-
ure of damages for such a conversion shall be the highest value
of the stocks between the time of conversion and time of trial.
Berberick's Estate, 264 Pa. 437; Sproul v. Sloan, 241 Pa. 284.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The judgment is affirmed.
NEVLIN v. SCARFE
Real Property-Title--Evidence-Validity of Title- Marketability of
Title
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Newlin, the plaintiff, contracted to sell for $2500, a lot to
Scarfe in fee. Scarfe refuses to pay because he will not obtain a
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marketable title. The lot had belonged to Schofield, who had di-
rected his executor to sell it. Subsequently Newlin was in pos-
session of it, and erected on it a house. Schofield's executor filed
an account, wherein he stated that he had sold the lot for $2000
to Newlin, the plaintiff and the account was affirmed and the money
divided equally between Schofields two children. The executors
deed was not found nor was it recor.
Taggart for the Plaintiff.
R. Young for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BACHMAN, J. The sole question in this case is whether
Newlin, the plaintiff, who derived his title from the executors,
can convey a marketable title and whether he can force the de-
fendant Scarfe, to take the land and pay the price.
The court is of the opinion that Newlin, the plaintiff, can
convey a good marketable title and that Scarfe is bound to pay the
money. A marketable title is one which is free from reasonable
doubt either In law or in fact. It must be one that a man on
receiving it will have ample assurance that it will not be defeat-
ed. There is no question in the case about the fact that the title
from Schofield was valid. Schofield had expressly authorized his
executor to sell it. So far the title is clear. Even though no
deed was recorded in the case, the executor's account wherein
$2000 is charged raises a strong presumption that the title from
the executors to Newlin was good.
The validity of a deed does not depend upon its recording.
Recording is prima facie evidence of delivery and the declarations
of grantor cannot overcome this presumption but such presump.
tion is not irrebutable. The recording of a deed simply gives no-
tice and is a warning to subsequent purchasers. In 39 Cyc. 1442,
it is stated: "The implication is that a good and marketable title
in fee simple is intended by the grantor in all executory con-
tracts for the sale of land."
The case of Wills v. Fixler, 257 Pa. 487, is on point with the
one at bar. In that case the court said that a finding that a con-
veyance by decedent's executors to Baer had been made was war-
ranted and although there was no deed upon record, a party
claiming under, Baer could convey a marketable title.
We regard this case as sufficient authority in view of the
similar facts and we therefore make a decree that Newlin can
convey a good title and that Scarfe be compelled to take the
land and to pay the price therefor. So ordered.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The action is by a vendor of land against the vendee for the
purchase money. Scarfe, the vendee, denies that Newlin, the
vendor, can give him a marketable title. Newlin bought the land
from the executors of Schofield. No deed is shown to have been
made. None is recorded. But, the heirs of Schofield directed the
executor" to sell it. The executor has filed an account, wherein
he charges himself with $2000, the price of the land, which he al-
leges that he has sold to Newlin. This account was confirmed.
The $2000 along with the other moneys was divided among
Schofield's two children, who, alone, could contest the sale. They
are then estopped from denying the sale. They cannot dispute
the title of the vendee, Newlin. No one else can dispute it. The
record shows the essential facts. The title obtainable by
Scarfe, is marketable. Cf. Wills v. Fisher, 257 Pa. 477.
The judgment of the learned court is AFFIRMED.
SCHIFF v. MILLER ET AL
Promissory Note--Alteration - Subscribing Witness - Attestation
After Signature of One of the Makers-Intent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A note for $300 was executed by Miller and Wilson. Three
days elapsed after Miller's signature when Wilson's was affixed.
In *that time Atbury wrote his name on the note as subscribing
witness, not stating which signature he intended to witness. At
the trial, Miller defends on the ground that the writing of the
name, Atbury, was a fraudulent alteration as to him. The court
held that it was for the jury to determine the intent. If it was
meant to attest 'Wilson's and not to deceive anyone Into think-
Ing that it was intended to attest Miller's signature also, the
signing was not a fraudulent alteration.
OPINION OF THE COURT
TAGGERT, J. The question in this case is whether the
court below erred in ruling, that it was for the jury to determine
the intent of Atbury.
The plaintiff in his brief, cites Kountz v. Kennedy, 63 Pa.
187, in justification of his claim that the alteration of the paper
should be disregarded. Following this case, we find that the
tendency of all our recent decisions is to hold parties more
strictly responsible for alterations of any kind particularly in
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the case of negotiable instruments. We think that the ruling in
Kountz v. Kennedy should not be extended beyond its own pe-
cullar facts.
The signing of the name of a subscribing witness to a note
after a party had signed, is a fraudulent alteration as to such a
party and relieves him from liability. Neff v, Homer, 63 Pa.
327 Barnard v. Kell, 271 Pa. 80; Shiffer v. Mosiqr, 225 Pa. 552.
It is a well settled rule in Pennsylvania, that: "the addition
of a name as a witness to the signature of the parties to a writ-
ten instrument after Its execution by them and In their absence
and without their knowleage and consent is a material alteration
of the writing, rendering it inadmissable in evidence. Swank
v. Kaufman, 255 Pa. 316.
In Craighead v. McLoney, 99 Pa. 211, Chief Justice Shars-
wood said: "the court has gone far enough in permitting writings
to be tampered with in any manner whatsoever.." We think that
he was correct in his theory and that the same is applicable and
should be applied to the case before the Bar.
We cannot agree with the lower court in its instructions re-
garding the intent of Atbury as under the leading cases on this
particular point we find that it has been consistently held that it
does not matter as to purpose or intent of the parties or mistake
in the matter. 255 Pa. 316, Supra.
The application of this rule does not, in the case of willful al-
teration, depend on the Injury done in the particular case, but as
is said in Neff v. Horner, 63 Pa. 327, its true ground is public
policy to insure the protection of instruments against fraud and
substitutions. "A material alteration releases a party
who does not consent thereto no matter how many other parties
consented. This is true whether the alteration was fraudulent or
innocent." Shiffer v. Mosier, supra.
I We think that the lower court erred in submitting the ques-
tion of intent to the jury and since It does not appear on the face
of the Instrument for whom he had intended to attest, we must
find as a matter f law that such alteration was fraudulent as to
the defendant, Miller.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COUI
Wilson's signature to the note, as maker, was made three days
after Miller's. Atbury subscribed the note as witness, at the same
time, not stating which signature he intended to witness. He could
rightfully have intended to witness Wilson's signature with his
consent. He could not rightfully have intended to witness Mill-
er's without his consent, and Miller did not consent. The position
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of the attestation is not described. Nothing hinders the attesta-
tion of but one of two signatures. The facts make possible sever-
al hypotheses: (1) The witness intended to attest both signatures;
(2) He intended to attest Wilson's; (3) He intended to attest Mill-
er's. If he intended to attest both, or Miller's, his act wEs fraudu-
lent, and the note was avoided. But, If he intended to Ekttest Wil-
son's, with Wilson's consent, he did not vitiate the note, although
the form of signature, gave rise to question, as to its intended pur-
pose. We think that the jury was the proper forum to decide what
the purpose was and that, it finding the purpose to have been to
attest only Wilson's signature, no detriment to the note has re-
sulted. Shaub v. Shaub, 71 Superior, 456.
The judgment of the learned court below must therefore be
REVERSED.
ATWOOD v. BANK
Banks and Banldng-Checks-Endorsements of Check-Identifica-
tion-Act of Apil 5, 1849, P. L. 426-Act of May 16, 1901 (N.
I. L.), P. L. 194
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Atwood kept an account in the defendant bank. X presented
a check purporting to be drawn by Y, a depositor of the bank. The
bank declined to pay it until the party presenting it got the en-
dorsement of Atwood. Atwood endorsed. He contends that he did
so simply that his endorsement was required to make him liable
as an endorser. The check turned out to be a forgery and the
Bank has charged the amount of it to Atwood's account. This is
an action to recover the amount thus detained by the Bank. The
court said that the endorsement could *not be understood simply
to express an identification of the person presenting the check,
unless the evidence was indubitable.
Peterson for the Plaintiff.
W. Young for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SPENGLER, J. The case presents this question. Where a
bank refuses to cash a check, unless the payee who presents it
gets an indorsement from a depositor of the bank and such depos-
itor places his name on the check but with the intent to identify
the payee only, will such depositor become liable on the check as
an accommodation indorser? We contend that Atwood became an
accommodation indorser. The Negotiable Instruments Act, Sec.
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29 specifies that: "an accommodation party is one who has signed
the instrument as a maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without
receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name
to some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument
to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at the time of
taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation
party." Section 17 of this act provides that: "where a signature
is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in what ca-
pacity the person making the same Intended to sign, he is to be
deemed an indorser." Section 63 of this act further provides that
where a "person placing his signature upon an instrument other-
wise than as maker, drawer or acceptor, is deemed to be an indor-
ser, unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his intention
to be bound in some other capacity." Considering these sections
with the question above stated, we cannot but conclude that At-
wood became liable on the check, as an indorser. Is the intent
with which Atwood signed material? Clearly not, for section 63
expressly provides that where a person places his name on an in-
strument he shall be deemed an indorser, "unless he clearly indi-
cates by appropriate words his intention to be bound In some other
capacity." The case as stated brings no facts before us that At-
wood did anything else than place his name upon it. I. e. did not
state in connection with his signature that he signed only to iden-
tify the person, and not as indorser or to lend his credit to the
payee. How could the bank know with what intent the plaintiff
signed if there was nothing on the check other than Atwood's
name? The plaintiff failed to indicAte his intention, and having
done so cannot hold the bank liable on the forged check, but is
himself to blame.
The plaintiff contends that even if he Is an indorser, he Is not
liable because there was no consideration. It Is not necessary to
answer this contention, for it is well settled in this state that there
need be no consideration between a holder for value and the party
accommodating. First National Bank v. Dick, 22 Supr. 445; De-
luma Trust Co. v. Hosier, 199 Pa. 17. Want of consideration Is
only a defense between the accommodating and the accommodated
party. Peal v. Addick, 174 Pa. 543. Section 29 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act expressly provides that an accommodation party
Is one who signs without receiving value therefor.
The plaintiff contends that there was negligence on the part
of the bank. We fail to see negligence. The banks throughout
the State use three methods, in case of doubt, to identify a person.
One is to have the stranger give a letter of introduction. This
practice is not to be encouraged and recommended. Another is
the requirement that the stranger bring a person known to the
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bank and have this person introduce him to the cashier, i. e. a
personal Introduction. This is the prevailing practice among the
banks. The third practice Is the one used in this case, i. e. re-
quire a stranger to get a depositor to Indorse his instrument. The
courts have approved this practice in numerous decisions and when
the Negotiable Instruments Act was adopted in this State they
incorporated this practice in Section 29 of the Act. The defendant
bank -was not negligent, In view of this authority and commer-
cial practice.
Finally the plaintiff bases recovery upon the principle that
an Indorser Is a surety. It is well settled in this State that an
indorser Is not a surety or guarantor. An accommodation indor-
ser, is liable to the holder for value as Indorser, and not as surety:
and will not be discharged by acts of the holder which would dis-
charge a surety, such, as time given to the accommodated party,
failure to sue him on notice, etc. Stephens v. Monongahela Na-
tional Bank, 88 Pa. 157; National Union Bank v. Todd, 132 Pa.
372.
There was no error in the instruction of the court. If any-
thing, it was favorable to the plaintiff.
Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
If Atwood endorsed the check, with the usual Intention, he
became liable to the bank for its genuineness of the signature of
Y, its depositor. The bank acquired a right to look to him for
reimbursement. See Act of April 5th, 1849, P. L. 426. Having
this right, it could appropriate so much of Atwood's deposit as
equalled the amount of the check. Judge v. West Philadelphia
T. & Trust Co., 68 Superior 310. The Important question then,
Is did Atwood endorse, in the ordinary sense of that word? He
might have written his name on the back of the check, In order
merely to identify the holder, but, while it Is permitted to show
that this was the purpose, the strong presumption Is, that the
purpose was that which ordinarily actuates endorsers, viz., to as-
sume a liability. The cashier of the bank testifies that the bank
so understood the purpose. What the evidence was to support
the allegation of the plaintiff, does not appear. The court told
the jury that it should be found by them to be indubitable. We
think this was correct. The verdict indicates that the evidence
In support of Atwood's contention was not found to be such. See
68 Superior 310; supra.
The judgment of the learned court below is
AFFIRMED.
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ECHOLS v. BANK
Banks and Banking-Promissory Notes--Collection-Loss By No-
tary---Falure to Give Notice--Damages
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Echols, a depositor in defendant bank, left with it for collection
a note for $200, drawn by X, payable to Y, indorsed by Y. The
bank put the note into the hands of a notary to collect, and on
non-payment to protest. In endeavoring to make demand of the
note, he lost the note and could not therefore present It, or give
notice of non-payment to Y. The bank after learning of the loss
neglected to notify Echols of It for a month. He sues for damages,
but gives no evidence of the effect of the loss of the note or of the
delay to inform him.
Kravitz for the Plaintiff.
Kauffman -for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
WOMER J. The principal question in this case Is whether
the bank Is liable for the loss of the note. In the present case
the service of the bank did not require the transmission of the
note to another place for the purpose of presentation to the maker
and notice to the Indorser in the event of dishonor. Therefore the
defendant was not in the strictest sense and most appropriate
sense of the term an agent for transmission only. Performance
of the bank's duty, in the case at bar, so far as it involves a pre-
sentation and notice of dishonor may be committed by the bank
to a competent and experienced notary, in the usual course and
the bank Is not liable for the notary's neglect to give notice to the
indorser. Bellemere v. Bank of the United States, 4 Wharton 105.
The defendant being an agent for collection, its duty was to. exer-
cise competent skill and proper care in the service that it under-
took to perform. Wingate v. Bank, 10 Pa. 104.
It would seem to follow logically that the negligence of the
notary through which the note was lost, is not imputable to the
bank. Thus In Moldauer v. Trust Co. of North America, 57 Su-
perior 66, it was held, that where a person who is a depositor in a
bank deposits a promlssor note for collection, and the bank places
the note In the hands of an experienced and competent notary
public with directions to collect the note or protest It for non-pay-
ment and the notary loses the note and does not protest it, the
Bank will not be liable for failure to protest the note, but will
be liable If it neglects for months to give him notice of the loss of
the note. In a suit by a depositor against the bank where there
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Is no averment in the statement of negligence to notify the depos-
itor of the loss of the note, but such evidence is shown at the trial
without objection, a judgment for the depositor will not be revers-
ed after a trial upon the merits. This is especially so where it
appears that the statement In assumpsit specifically alleged an Im-
plied agreement on the part of the bank to return the note and
failure to do so. In such a suit the defendant Is not entitled to
binding instructions in its favor because the plaintiff offered no
testimony in regards to pecuniary loss as the plaintiff is entitled
to recover at least nominal damages. Holler v. Weiner, 15 Pa.
242; Adams Express Company v. Egbert, 36 Pa. 360.
In Farmers National Bank of Beaver Falls, Appellant, v. Nel-
son, 255 Pa. 455, it was held that a bank with which commercial
paper is left by its customer to be transmitted for collection is the
agent of the owner only and is not liable for the negligence or de-
fault of its correspondent or agents to whom it is necessary to
transmit the paper, if it used reasonable care and diligence in the
selection of the agent. See also Bank v. Goodman, 109 Penna.
422, and Farmers National Bank v. Peoples National Bank, 263
Pa. 266.
Therefore our conclusion in this case must be that where a
depositor leaves with the bank a note for collection, and the bank
employs a sub-agent or notary to collect the note, if it selects a no.
tary who is competent and worthy of trust, the bank's duty is end-
ed. The depositor must look to the notary or sub-agent for any
default or negligence of which he is guilty. Counsel for the plain-
tiff contends that this rule is very unjust and that we should set
it aside but we believe this to be good law and must follow it.
Verdict for the defendant rendered accordingly.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
There are two questions here: (1) Is the negligence of the no-
tary to be imputed to the bank. (2) Is the bank's delay In inform-
ing Echols of the loss of the notes, negligence incurring liability
for damages to Echols?
(1) We think the defendant bank had a right to select a no-
tary to make demand on the maker of the note for payment, and
to give the notices to the endorsers necessary to preserve their
liability. Farmers National Bank v. Nelson, 255 Pa. 455; Mer-
chants National Bank v. Goodman, 109 Pa. 422; Moldawer v.
Trust Co., 59 Superior 155. Nothing shows that the character or
reputation of the notary selected made his employment unwise or
improper. The loss of the liability of the endorser, in consequence
of the failure to demand payment at maturity, and to give the
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endorser immediate notice of the non-payment, Is imputable to the
notary, and not to the defendant.
(2) The bank gave no notice for a month, to the plaintiff of
the loss. This was an unreasonable delay. But, has it produced
any loss? It does not appear that it has. The maker of the note
remains liable. Is he solvent? If so, no damage will result from
the discharge of the endorsers. The endorsers, being discharged,
delay in giving the notice has not affected the power of the plain-
tiff to make the endorser pay. It is impossible to see how actual
damage has occurred from the bank's delay, unless tardiness in
suing the maker has jeopardized a recovery. But, there is no evi-
dence offered of any loss. At the most, the damages would be
merely nominal, but the plaintiff would escape the costs. Cf. Mol-
dawer v. Trust Co., 59 Superior 155. The learned court below
seems not to have considered the delay of the defendant, In giv-
ing notice to the plaintiff.
REVERSED.
